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Legal and Economic Strategies for International
Intellectual Property Protection:
The Case of Software
Liz Dunshee
ABSTRACT.  Intellectual property is an important asset for business and society.  In 1998,
the worldwide software market was estimated at $135 billion.  Piracy, however, is
reducing profits, innovation, investment, and tax revenues.  In order to curb piracy,
international intellectual property protection must be improved.  This paper analyzes the
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and the World Intellectual Property
Organization.  It also examines other methods of intellectual property protection, including
arbitration, Digital Rights Management Systems, and price discrimination.  Evidence
suggests that optimal protection includes a mixture of international laws, pricing strategies,
and governmental intervention.
I.  The Importance of Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property is an increasingly important asset for businesses and
society as a whole.  It is a key element in the globalization and growth of
the world economy.  Software is a key component of this growth.  In
1998, the worldwide software market was estimated at $135 billion.  The
United States captured seventy percent of global software sales [Gopal
and Sanders, 2000, para. 1].
Piracy, however, is an increasing problem for the software industry.
Not only is piracy wrong from a moral standpoint, but it also diminishes
revenues and reduces incentives for investment in research and
development.  Software piracy is responsible for lost jobs, wages, and tax
revenues.  It also creates a potential barrier to success for software start-
ups around the globe.  According to the Software Publishers Association,
piracy losses for the worldwide software industry topped $12.2 billion in
1999, for a cumulative total of $59.2 billion lost over the preceding five
years. Losses were greatest in the United States and Canada, where they
exceeded $3.6 billion [Software Protection Agency Report, 2000, para.
1].
Intellectual property protection will not only curb the software
industry’s monetary losses, but it will also help society in the long run by
enabling growth.  Incentives for innovation will rise as innovators are
rewarded for their creativity.  Investors in research and development will
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also experience decreased risk as private property rights are enforced.
Strict intellectual property protection will thus prompt innovators and
investors to put additional time and money towards innovation, whereas
weak protection will decrease incentives for innovation.  Macroeconomic
theory states that sustained growth in production is only possible when
technology improves.  Hence incentives to encourage technological
innovation are essential for production gains in the long run. 
Strict enforcement of intellectual property rights will also yield
current benefits.  Legitimate software sales generate tax revenue that may
be used for social programs or additional research and development.
Intellectual property protection also aids developing countries because it
attracts foreign capital to developing markets. Countries that enforce
private property rights offer lower investment risk than those that don’t.
Foreign capital will be attracted to the less risky markets.  Developing
countries with strict intellectual property rights and low piracy rates will
thus receive more direct foreign investment than similar countries with
high piracy rates.  
There are various ways to deal with piracy.  Policymakers must be
aware of the costs and benefits of different alternatives.  The optimal
amount of protection will promote innovation and increase software
availability in the long run.  The protection must also be efficiently
enforced.  This paper argues that optimal protection includes a mixture of
international laws, pricing strategies, and government intervention.
II.  Arguments against Intellectual Property Protection
Although most people acknowledge that intellectual property
protection is necessary, there are also critics of excessive regulation.  The
critics accuse software publishers of using copyrights to stifle innovation
and protest that the fair use of information has been suppressed. Lawrence
Lessig, a well-known opponent of excessive intellectual property
regulation, argues that innovation is enabled by the freedom to share.  He
contends that copyright owners dominate and constrain the marketplace
of ideas.  According to Lessig, if free software is available, it can be used
by anyone to build new or enhanced software.  Individuals will be more
creative than companies, who tend to merely upgrade existing products
in incremental steps.  Hence making software freely available will let
users develop new technologies, which enables society to continue to
advance at a rapid pace [Zilner, 2002, para. 4, 6].  
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Lessig suggests that government should encourage the development
of open code by using it for all government computers, and should share
the code with anyone who is interested [Zilner, 2002, para. 17].  He also
proposes changes to the copyright and patent system.  Currently, a
copyright for software extends to seventy years beyond the death of the
author.  Usually, the software is obsolete long before the copyright has
expired.  Lessig advocates a five-year term of protection for copyrighted
material, renewable for another five years.  He also suggests that the
author must include a complete source code, which would be held by the
Copyright Office.  When the copyright expires, the code would be
released to the public.  
In the case of patents, Lessig urges that the patent office study
whether the patenting of software is more likely to aid innovation than to
harm it [Zilner, 2002, para. 19].  Zilner also refers to James Buchanan, a
Nobel Laureate in economics [2002, para. 12].  Buchanan suggests that
innovators are reluctant to work in an area in which patent holders could
exert a claim on parts of the innovator’s work.  Thus, according to
Buchanan and Lessig, the excessive issuance of patents may stifle
innovation.
Lessig’s arguments give important background information to the
intellectual property debate. They are persuasive, but his suggestions may
have drawbacks. Basic economic theory argues that incentives are
necessary for continuous innovation.  As mentioned, investment and tax
revenue also increase when intellectual property rights are strictly
enforced.  Lessig’s views should be considered, but it is generally
accepted that some amount of intellectual property protection is needed.
Many of Lessig’s criticisms emphasize problems with the legal
system rather than the degree of intellectual property protection.  His
arguments indicate that there are problems with current intellectual
property laws, and that the legal environment may need to change to
encourage innovation.  International intellectual property organizations
and copyrights must be examined because they are an important
component of this environment.  
III.  International Agreements: TRIPS and WIPO
Experts continue to argue about the necessary amounts and methods of
protection, and the debate stretches beyond national boundaries. The
Internet has contributed to faster globalization, and sharing information
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has become quicker and easier.  Countries must cooperate to protect
intellectual property, but norms and enforcement tactics differ. 
Several international agreements have attempted to facilitate
cooperation.  One prominent treaty is the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.  The treaty is a
component of the World Trade Organization and was put into effect in
1995.  The TRIPS agreement establishes standards of protection, rules of
enforcement, and the application of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism to resolve intellectual property disputes between member
states.  The agreement was formed because global standards for the
protection of intellectual property rights were inadequate.  In addition,
international enforcement was ineffective.  These weaknesses were
harming legitimate commercial interests.  Although there were two prior
conventions governing intellectual property, they did not establish
binding, universal minimum standards.  The 1883 Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property and the 1886 Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works remain important standards,
and the TRIPS agreement builds upon their foundations.  The agreement
also creates international minimum standards for the protection of various
forms of intellectual property, including copyrights, trademarks, and
patents.  Software may be covered under each of these three categories,
but this paper will mainly focus on copyright protection.
The TRIPS agreement clarifies existing obligations under the Berne
Convention and adds some specific points.  Under the Berne Convention,
once a literary work is protected under copyright in one country, it is
protected in all.   Article 10 of the TRIPS agreement provides that
“computer programs, whether in source [human readable] or object
[machine readable] code, shall be protected as literary works under the
Berne Convention (1971)” [Harvard Law Review, 2003, para. 8].  The
Article also states that “compilations of data or other material, … which
by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute
intellectual creations shall be protected as such.”  In addition, such
protection “shall not extend to the data or . . . [the] material itself.”
Article 9 also specifies that only expressions and not “ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such” are protected
under general copyright law [Harvard Law Review, 2003, para. 8].
The TRIPS agreement uses a dispute resolution method to enforce its
statutes.  The method is intended to promote consistency and
predictability.  When disputes arise, a panel of three to five independent
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members with experience in international trade law or policy convenes.
The panel receives written and oral evidence from every party involved
and makes an objective decision.  The countries involved may not block
the adoption of the panel’s decision, but they may appeal to another
quasi-judicial group, the Appellate Body.  The Appellate Body may
“uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the
panel,” and its final reports must be “unconditionally accepted by the
parties to the dispute” [Harvard Law Review, 2003, para. 11].
The TRIPS Agreement has improved global intellectual property
protection, but it is not the only source of international law in this area.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has also played a
key role in the establishment of global intellectual property protection
standards since 1970.  The musicians at Woodstock may not have worried
about Napster, but WIPO has kept up with changing technologies and
increasing globalization.  Like the TRIPS agreement, WIPO was also
based on the Paris and Berne Conventions. 
Recently, WIPO realized the need for a global strategy of intellectual
property development.  In 1998 the organization began a deep
transformation process to move towards this goal.  Since then, WIPO has
focused on the effects of information technology on intellectual property.
The organization has also worked with the WTO to enforce intellectual
property rights.  On January 1, 1996, WIPO and the WTO agreed to
cooperate to implement the TRIPS agreement.  In 1998, the organizations
established a joint initiative to help developing countries meet their
TRIPS obligations by the year 2000 [General Information about WIPO,
2003, para. 67-8].  Assistance has continued from both organizations.
WIPO has also set several important goals of its own.
The World Intellectual Property Organization primarily works to
coordinate international intellectual property legislation and procedures.
It created a Digital Agenda to help harmonize intellectual property
procedures and increase cooperation between member states.  Under the
Digital Agenda, the organization formulates appropriate responses that
will encourage the use and creation of intellectual property. The Digital
Agenda also realizes the need for adjustments of intellectual property law
in the Internet environment and aims to familiarize developing countries
with new technology.  Dispute resolution is also a key element of the
Agenda.  It proposes the eventual use of an online resolution system,
which will allow for swift and efficient decisions.
The online resolution system may be possible through WIPOnet, an
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essential component of the Digital Agenda.  WIPOnet is a “global
intellectual property information network” that promotes international
cooperation by linking the intellectual property offices of its member-
states [General Information about WIPO, 2003, para. 56].  The link will
facilitate the digital exchange of intellectual property. The exchange will
“enhance the worldwide use of strategic information for more effective
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights” [General
Information about WIPO, 2003, para. 57].
WIPO’s goal for harmonization is important, but stability and the
perception of equality by members are also key elements for success.
Cooperation among members leads to a stronger organization. WIPO
currently has 179 members, and more are apt to join as its policies
become recognized as the norm [General Information about WIPO, 2003,
para. 2].  As membership increases, so will the organization’s strength.
This will aid international intellectual property protection.  WIPO has
developed “Nationally-Focused Action Plans” to modernize the
intellectual property law of less developed countries and to encourage
their involvement in the organization.  These tailor-made assistance plans
cover a one to three-year time period for targeted countries.  In 2001, 56
Nationally-Focused Action Plans were executed by WIPO [About WIPO,
2003, para. 71].  Obviously, WIPO works to include and empower a
variety of countries.  According to their website,
All parties interested to a smaller or larger extent in intellectual
property or having major stakes are included in the international
dialogue conducted by WIPO.  Those which have limited or no
means of participating or of taking advantage of the intellectual
property system are provided or empowered with the requisite
training, information, equipment or appropriate support by WIPO
[General Information about WIPO, 2003, para. 92].
The World Intellectual Property Organization administers twenty-
three international treaties, with six pertaining to copyrights [General
Information about WIPO, 2003, para. 6].  The WIPO Copyright Treaty
was adopted in 1996.  The scope of material covered under copyright
protection is identical to that of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights agreement.  It “extends to expressions and not to ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such” [Article 2 of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996, para. 1].  Protection of software on the
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Internet is vague under the guidelines of this treaty.  Article 8 does
specify that 
Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing any communication to the public of their
works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available
to the public of their works in such a way that members of the
public may access these works from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them,
 
But it does not explicitly state if software is included in this protection
[Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996, para. 1].
IV.  Problems with TRIPS and WIPO
TRIPS and WIPO have established important standards for international
intellectual property protection.  The treaties, however, still have areas
that need improvement.  International relations theory, through its
branches of realism, institutionalism, and liberalism, addresses their
problems.  They are also addressed by recently created alternative
proposals, which rely on the values of uniformity, certainty, and
pluralism.  
The realist branch of international relations theory argues that
countries act selfishly when they establish international agreements.
Loopholes in procedural standards will enable powerful countries to
selfishly interpret treaties.  Realism implies that countries that advocate
strong intellectual property protection may have incentives to incorporate
their own enforcement techniques into policies.  For example, ambiguous
standards in the TRIPS Agreement have allowed the United States to
establish a policy commonly referred to as “Special 301.”  The policy
requires the United States Trade Representative to annually review the
intellectual property practices of U.S. trading partners and to sanction
countries whose intellectual property protection regimes are deemed
unfair to U.S. interests.  “The punitive measures embodied in rules such
as Special 301 allow powerful, resolute states like the United States to
impose punishments, or withhold benefits, sufficient to induce a potential
reneger to comply” [Harvard Law Review, 2003, para. 17].
Rules like Special 301 are not part of an efficient long-term solution
to the intellectual property problem.  Relations with countries who
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perceive such a policy as imperialistic may be undermined.  There is also
a widely held view, even among developed states, that “unilateral action,
such as that which can be taken under Special 301, is contrary to the letter
and spirit of GATT” [Harvard Law Review, 2003, para. 18].  
Developed countries have strong interests in intellectual property
protection, but an effective policy must also cater to the needs of less-
developed countries in order to gain their compliance.  Advanced
countries will benefit from this compliance because it will strengthen
international agreements.   Compliance will also help the less-developed
countries by fostering outside investment and domestic innovation.  As
mentioned earlier, the lower investment risk that results from the
existence of private property protection will attract foreign capital.
Innovators within the country will also receive rewards for their creativity
when intellectual property is protected.  This incentive will lead to more
innovation within the country.  Countries around the globe will benefit as
innovation is stimulated within developing countries.  As Jack Handey
said, “I hope if dogs ever take over the world, and they chose a king, they
don't just go by size, because I bet there are some Chihuahuas with some
good ideas,” [Deep Thoughts Archive, 2001, para. 1].  In the same sense,
less-developed countries will make contributions to our global economy
if they are given the chance.  A good international policy should be
effective without the use of Special 301 or similar legislation.
The effectiveness of international agreements depends upon the level
of cooperation among countries.  Fostering compliance, as mentioned,
will benefit both advanced and less-developed countries.  Cooperation is
also important for international treaties because nonmembers have the
power to thwart member goals.  In an electronic environment, non-
signatories may be able to evade the goals of international agreements,
even though they are not powerful in the traditional sense.  This, in turn,
may discourage other countries from cooperating with the treaties.  A
form of prisoner’s dilemma exists because countries only benefit from the
treaties if a large number of other countries are involved.  In addition, a
few uncooperative non-signatories may become data havens, due to non-
existent or poorly enforced foreign copyright laws.  Content owners fear
data havens because they “facilitate the widespread duplication and
distribution of copyrighted content” [Franklin and Morris, 2002, para.
40].  If the havens are not completely self-sufficient, members of an
international convention may be able to use coordinated electronic
blockades or standard trade sanctions against them.  Establishing a
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cooperative atmosphere at the outset of an international agreement,
however, may be a more efficient solution.  A cooperative environment
will increase membership and support for international treaties.  This, in
turn, will decrease the likelihood of data havens.
This cooperation may be harmed by selfish actions, such as by the use
of Special 301.  Policies must be continuously reviewed to prevent the
establishment of such rules.  Continuous review will help ensure fairness
and uniformity.  The method and probability of enforcement must be
consistent across all participating countries.  If asymmetric enforcement
exists, companies may relocate to non-enforcing countries where the risk
of litigation is lower.  This type of nationality shopping will harm the
economies of enforcing countries and help those of the non-enforcers,
which will decrease support for intellectual property protection in the
long run.
WIPO and TRIPS must also provide a degree of certainty to foster
cooperation.  An ambiguous agreement or unpredictable enforcement will
harm society by deterring actors from exchanging information on the
Internet.  International agreements should thus ensure that people are able
to make informed decisions about various courses of action.
Unpredictable rules force potential defendants to constantly keep up with
changes.  Only the biggest multinational corporations will be capable of
this.  Society’s well being will decrease as smaller innovators are forced
out of business, and risk and uncertainty will discourage investment in
multinational intellectual property initiatives.  If procedural standards are
ambiguous, powerful countries will also have a greater temptation to
manipulate rules.  Valuing certainty will help protect the interests of
smaller countries by decreasing the likelihood of selfish legislation.  The
TRIPS Agreement, as mentioned, fosters certainty through its dispute
resolution method.  Reliable methods such as this will encourage
countries to support WIPO and TRIPS.  
Uniform, predictable international standards are important to a certain
extent, but Franklin and Morris argue that “there is little demand in the
world as yet for a totally homogenized legal culture” [2002, para. 68].
Uniformity and predictability must be balanced with the value of
pluralism to achieve the optimal amount of cooperation.  The legal
standards of international agreements must have a certain degree of
flexibility.  The agreements will gain support if they attempt to respect a
variety of legal cultures.  In addition, nations provide laboratories for
social experiments.  The success and failure of various legal systems and
9
Dunshee: Legal and Economic Strategies for International Intellectual Prop
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 2003
Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2003 57
substantive laws can be easily observed.  International standards that
honor pluralism can be altered as the benefits and drawbacks of various
legal systems become apparent.  This decreases the risk of implementing
a faulty universal policy.
WIPO and TRIPS must be able to conform to cultural standards of
various countries without compromising their basic goal of intellectual
property protection.  A flexible approach to implementation will foster
compliance and enhance the value of pluralism.  As mentioned,
continuous review of both policies and implementation methods is also
necessary.  Review will not only ensure fairness and uniformity, but it
will also facilitate assistance, education, and capacity-building tools for
developing countries. 
The TRIPS Agreement will rely on the WTO’s Trade Policy Review
Mechanism to monitor implementation standards and encourage flexible
judgments.  WIPO, as mentioned, has already proposed an online
resolution system as a part of the Digital Agenda.  This system will allow
for swift and flexible decisions.  WIPO’s Nationally Focused Action
Plans will also encourage cooperation by empowering and educating less-
developed countries.  Excessive legislation and the use of rules like
Special 301 have created an imperialistic environment for intellectual
property protection and discouraged cooperation.  WIPO’s Nationally
Focused Action Plans introduce methods of intellectual property
protection to developing countries in a non-threatening way.  Education
has helped the governments of less-developed countries understand the
importance of international intellectual property protection.
Many times, this education has been made possible through the help
of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  For instance, the
International Intellectual Property Alliance and the Business Software
Alliance have been very involved with software anti-piracy programs.
They are dedicated to promoting international intellectual property
protection, and have experience reporting and testifying to governments.
These organizations are also in a good position to promote education in
developing countries.  They can assist in the broadcast of legal norms and
the benefits of intellectual property protection.  
Liberalism stresses the importance of NGOs in international
cooperation.  The World Intellectual Property Organization has enlisted
the help of many non-governmental organizations.  There are currently
170 NGOs with observer status [General Information about WIPO, 2003,
para. 7].  A major criticism of the TRIPS Agreement is that it has not
10
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created a role for NGOs. These organizations help WIPO with
enforcement and education.  Liberalism not only suggests that NGOs may
be involved with education, but also that they may help establish the rules
themselves.  One proposal entails bargaining between governments and
private firms, using the TRIPS agreement as a basic set of default rules.
V. Common Law, Digital Rights Management, and
Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property
Protection
The practice of private bargaining has increased.  Constantly changing
technology may increase reliance on dispute resolution and private
bargaining methods.   These methods are more flexible than traditional
legislation and may also enable faster resolutions.  Some experts suggest
that greater reliance on private bargaining, along with other trends, may
eventually decrease reliance on international legislation in general.
The usefulness of international agreements, especially in a business
setting, could lessen as alternative dispute resolution becomes more
prevalent.  International laws would not be needed if alternative dispute
resolution clauses were incorporated into the majority of contracts.
Alternative dispute resolution has its benefits, but may not offer the
predictability of civil law.  It also may create unfair advantages for the
party drafting a contract, as they are the ones to specify the type of
dispute resolution.
A common law approach to dispute resolution may offer some of the
same benefits of alternative dispute resolution, while also providing a
stable procedural background to ensure fairness.  This approach provides
an efficient combination of flexibility and legislation.  Statutes provide
an important legal framework, but cannot stand alone.  They may not be
able to keep up with the changing technological environment.  A flexible,
common law approach to international property protection may be more
useful than complete reliance on international statutes.
Mark Twain once said “Reader, suppose you were an idiot.  And
suppose you were a member of Congress.  But I repeat myself” [Mark
Twain Quotes, 2003, para. 1]. Although not expressed so bluntly, this
view prevails among many in the field of intellectual property.  In an
article for the Vanderbilt Law Review, Suzanna Sherry suggests a solution
to intellectual property disputes is better found through common law
11
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methods. 
Congress often enacts legislation because of a perceived crisis when
applicable judicial interpretations already exist. A problem arises because
“legislation designed to address questions raised by a rapidly changing
technology is likely to become obsolete equally quickly” [Sherry, 2002,
para. 6].  Congress is unlikely to revisit the issue for some time, which
may create confusing and unintended consequences.  Judicial decisions,
on the other hand, do not have the global reach of legislation.  Reliance
on judicial decisions enables observation and gradual adaptation of
common law.  A common law approach to intellectual property protection
may also enable Congress to address more important matters. Sherry
states that “if the federal legislature continually reacts to the crisis of the
moment, it may neglect more long-term problems” [2002, para. 12].   
How do these domestic issues apply to international intellectual
property issues? International organizations such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization are generally less hasty than Congress when
enacting regulations, although they still must contend with a rapidly
changing environment.  The issues more directly apply when we consider
that international harmonization is often used as a justification for
domestic laws.  The goal of harmonization puts additional pressure on
Congress.  Reliance on legislation may be inefficient in other countries
as well as ours, which means that an obsession with international
legislation is not beneficial.  If a common law approach is used
internationally, individual nations will benefit.  International agreements
will also be inherently stronger because they will not contain useless or
outdated statutes.  A common law approach offers extra time and the
knowledge of successive experiences for establishing standards, and may
be more efficient than established statutes when unforeseen changes arise.
Complete dependence on common law may also create problems.  As
with alternative dispute resolution methods, the values of uniformity and
predictability may be compromised.  In addition, congestion may become
a problem in courts that are specifically created for intellectual property
cases.  Existing international organizations have been working to address
these issues.  As mentioned, there has been a trend towards alternative
dispute resolution methods.  Arbitration has already been incorporated
into some international treaties.  Arbitration and common-law approaches
are not identical, but both approach international problems without
complete reliance on specific legal statutes.  The technique is cost-
effective for businesses and helps free up the judicial system, but may
12
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compromise uniformity and predictability.  The benefits of arbitration and
common-law must be weighed against these costs.
Technology may also play a role in the relative usefulness of
international agreements.  Although greater use of technology may create
a need for international copyright protection, technology itself could also
prevent unlawful use of certain materials.  Digital Rights Management
Systems are the preventative measures that copyright owners may take.
For instance, a compact disc may be playable but not copyable, or
playable only a limited number of times.  For a few years, Microsoft took
this approach with its software, allowing users to install material exactly
two times from a compact disc. These technological restraints may offer
a combination of low cost and high likelihood of enforceability.  In
addition, the legal battles between content owners and users are
minimized.  Technology restraints protect property without legal aid.  
The effects of technological restraints may be viewed as either
benefits or costs.  The use of the restraints may benefit society by
decreasing congestion in legal courts.  They may also create higher
incentives for innovation because of the high degree of enforcement.
However, fewer users would have access to software, decreasing society’s
benefit from the innovation in the short run.   Because technology is
constantly changing, content owners may also spend more time and
money working to protect existing property than creating new programs.
In addition, some competitors may offer material lock-free, creating an
uneven marketplace.
Digital Rights Management Systems and common law approaches can
help prevent piracy.  These methods offer advantages over international
treaties, but they also have drawbacks of their own.  Some experts argue
that economic actions may be the most efficient way to protect
intellectual property.  In the article “Pirated for Profit,” Slive and
Bernhardt [1998, 886-91] suggest that software publishers use a subtle
form of price discrimination to increase profits.  Their strategy is to
differentiate between business and home consumers, essentially charging
a price of zero to the home consumers.  These consumers are less willing
to pay and more difficult to prosecute for intellectual property violations.
The potential costs of piracy are higher for businesses, so they will be
more willing to pay for legitimate software.  Businesses also incur
positive network externalities when their employees gain familiarity with
software outside the business setting.  If network externalities for specific
programs are high enough, businesses will have incentives to purchase
13
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them.  Thus software companies can profit from limited piracy by home
consumers.  The authors support their claim by stating that anti-piracy
efforts are mainly directed at businesses [Slive and Bernhardt, 1998, 895-
6].  
Slive and Bernhardt make some important points.  Their study, which
was conducted in 1998, demonstrates a relationship among externalities,
legal prices, and the piracy rate.  However, the software environment in
2003 is dramatically different from what it was in 1998.  Network
externalities have become less pronounced because the general public has
gained proficiency with many types of software.  The claim is also
weakened by the fact that individuals have recently been targeted for
intellectual property violations.  According to the New York Times, the
record industry recently filed lawsuits against four college students
[Harmon, 2003, A1].  The industry is charging them with copyright
infringement and seeking billions of dollars in damages.  
The general idea of price discrimination, however, has merits.  A
more direct form of price discrimination may help tackle the international
piracy problem.  A high incidence of piracy is often associated with
certain market factors.  Within a country, both ability and willingness to
pay affect the frequency of intellectual property violations.  Piracy
generally occurs in developing countries where authentic software is
unavailable or perceived to be unfairly priced.  Citizens of most countries
cannot afford software when it is sold at the same price as in the United
States.  The relatively high price provides justification for both the
violators and their respective governments to allow or at least tolerate
piracy.  Empirical evidence supports this theory, as countries with low per
capita gross national product show the highest piracy rates.  The
relationship is most pronounced for countries with per-capita gross
national products less than $6000 [Gopal and Sanders, 2000, para. 14].
Governments in these countries are not unaware of the benefits of
intellectual property protection.  They know that piracy impedes the
growth of the domestic software industry and lowers tax revenues.  Yet
it is inefficient for governments to discourage piracy because software use
will be severely restricted if strict copyright laws are enforced. 
Although a focus on international property rights may have marginal
success in deterring piracy, the pricing strategies of software companies
must also be addressed.  Software companies may use a global price
discrimination policy to deter piracy.  Such a strategy could substantially
alter the piracy incentives for governments and their citizens.  Critics
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argue that price discrimination is difficult because it requires effective
measurement of customer preferences and a mechanism for preventing
arbitrage.  The software publishing industry, however, has already been
using this technique in several different ways.  In addition to the indirect
means mentioned earlier, companies also grant site licenses and practice
customer segmentation. Arbitrage is controlled through the distribution
channel.  Companies may also provide different versions of their product
for different groups of users.  
A price discrimination policy based on national criteria could just as
easily be implemented.  Gopal and Sanders suggest that national income
levels broadly capture the willingness-to-pay function [2000, para. 24].
Thus, the per-capita gross national product would be a simple index for
price. Although some amount of arbitrage may occur, the danger of
software flowing from poor to rich countries is relatively slim when the
strict enforcement of copyright laws and entrenched cultural values of
developed countries are considered.   In theory, once the legal price of
software corresponds with citizens’ ability to pay, the government’s
incentives to enforce intellectual property rights increase substantially.
The governments would work to protect intellectual property in order to
accelerate the growth of the domestic software industry and to increase
the tax revenues from software sales.  Consumers would also benefit from
the support provided with legitimate software.  A positive environment
for intellectual property protection would be established as the trend of
legitimate purchasing gained momentum.  
Price discrimination seems like a simple solution to a complicated
piracy problem, but it hasn’t been widely adopted.  This may be because
United States publishers do not view citizens of developing countries as
part of their customer base.  They may also be relying on the government
to subsidize research and development.  Although subsidies may increase
incentives for innovation, they tend to be less efficient than market
incentives.  It may be difficult for the government to determine an
appropriate level for subsidies, and the tax revenue may be better used
somewhere else.  
VI. Conclusion
It seems that each of the possible solutions for piracy have drawbacks.  Is
there a way for society to maximize innovation and utility?  A mixture of
international laws, pricing strategies, and governmental intervention may
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best solve the piracy problem.  Price discrimination may be a viable
strategy for simultaneously increasing profits and benefiting consumers,
but it must be backed with strong international copyright laws to deter
arbitrage.  Because intellectual property is a public good, some amount
of government subsidization may also be necessary.  The best strategy
will be one that provides flexible laws and an environment that stimulates
innovation.  The values of uniformity, predictability, and pluralism should
be upheld.  Regulations should be sufficient to create incentives for
innovation, but should not be excessive.
Users and software companies must also help protect intellectual
property.  Users have a moral obligation to respect intellectual property.
They must also be educated that they will benefit from its protection in
the long run.  Software companies must realize that, regardless of these
benefits, users will continue to find ways around technological and legal
barriers if they perceive them as unfair.  As suggested earlier, this
philosophy is demonstrated by the high rates of piracy in poor countries.
It can also be observed in the popularity of peer-to-peer music sharing.
The outrageous pricing strategies of record companies were revealed after
Napster facilitated cheap and easy copying.  Software companies may
face the same fate if they do not adapt to changing customer bases.
International organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization, have helped decrease piracy through international laws and
education for less-developed countries.  The laws may protect intellectual
property to some extent, but enforcement and adaptability are
questionable.  The education may also be useless if the price of legitimate
software is significantly higher than the expected costs of piracy.  Hence,
the burden of intellectual property protection falls not only on these
international organizations but also on software companies and users.
Society is a victim of the loss of innovation.  Pricing strategies, laws, and
users all play a part in stimulating innovation for the future.
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